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STUDENT NOTES
urge that the public should be protected from acts of children. It
is as reasonable to assert that children, less capable of exercising
care, ought to be protected from the carelessness of individual
members of the public. This seems to be one basis at least for the
recognized presumption that small children have not been negli-
gent, even where the presumption is not conclusive. Most of the
courts which deny a conclusive presumption admit a rebuttable
one."0 It should be kept in mind that, at any event, the negligence
of a defendant must be established before there may be a recovery.
There is no question involved of burdening an innocent public with
the careless acts of small children.
The decisions in few states are sufficiently numerous to indi-
cate where particular courts draw the line. Massachusetts holds
that a child of three years and one month is incapable of contrib-
utory negligence.'Y But, of a child of four years, the same court
asserts that, while a child of that age is too young to possess much
prudence, it can not be said, as a matter of law, that such a child
is incapable of exercising any care.' s A few courts might con-
ceivably go this far. Perhaps these courts feel, as the West Vir-
ginia court suggests in Prunty v. Traction Co., that, at any event,
no reasonable jury is likely to find a child of very tender years
guilty of contributory negligence sufficient to bar recovery against
an adult wrongdoer. By way of dictum, at least, the West Virginia
court now seems to adopt the view of this supposed reasonable
jury.
C. L. C.
THE MODERN TENDENCY TOWARD THE
PROTECTION OF THE AESTHETIC
While recognizing as nuisances those things which are unduly
offensive to the senses of smell or hearing,' equity has generally
refused to recognize as nuisances those things which are offensive
to the eye or aesthetic tastes, 2 even when the presence of the thing
'6 Boykin v. Coast Line R. Co., 211 N. C. 113, 189 S. E. 177 (1936).
27 londeau v. Kay, 282 Mass. 452, 184 N. E. 926 (1933).
is McIfonough v. Vazzela, 247 Mass. 552, 142 N. E. 831 (1924).
1 CLARK, EQUiTY (1924) § 203; WOOD, LAw OF NUISANCES (2d ed. 1883)
§ 3.
2 WooD, LAw OF NUIsANCEs §§ 3, 7; Ross v. Butler, 19 N. J. Eq. 294, 303,
97 Am. Dec. 654 (1868); Lane v. City of Concord, 70 N. H. 485, 49 Atl. 687
(1900) ; Whitmore v. Brown, 102 Me. 47, 65 Atl. 516 (1906) ; Woodstock Burial
Ground Ass'n v. Hager, 68 Vt. 488, 35 Atl. 431 (1896); Houston Gas & Fuel
Co. v. Harlow, 297 S. W. 570 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
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complained of lessens the value of surrounding property.3 The
explanation of this attitude seems to lie largely in the fact that the
courts are hesitant to recognize an individual interest which is in-
capable of being measured by an objective standard.4 The practical
difficulty of determining, to say nothing of proving, what causes
an actionable injury to the aesthetic sensibilities of an individual
is obvious.5 In addition to this consideration, there is a reluctance
on the part ol the courts to place further restrictions on the legally
recognized incidents of the ownership of property in order to pro-
tect the mental comfort of the individual.'
Nothwithstanding the legal soundness of the above consider-
ations, there is apparent a growing modern tendency toward legal
recognition of "aesthetic considerations". The trend of the courts
toward the protection of mental comfort is illustrated by those
cases involving injunctions against the establishment of under-
taking parlors in residential sections. These cases, while not in-
volving what may properly be termed "aesthetic considerations,"
do present the closely analogous problem of protection against
"mental depression"' occasioned by the constant reminder of
death. A clear majority of such cases' recognize in this purely
subjective mental condition an individual interest entitled to legal
3WOOD, LAw OF NUISANCES § 3; Ross v. Butler; Woodstock Burial Ground
Ass'n v. Hager; Houston Gas & Fuel Co. v. Harlow, all supra n. 2.
4 Pound, Interests of Personalty (1915) 38 HAnv L. REv. 343, 359-363.
While Dean Pound's article discusses mental comfort in connection with tort
law, what he says woula seem to be equally applicable to mental comfort in
connection with the law of nuisances. See also Parkersburg Builders Material
Co. v. Barrack, 191 S. E. 368, 369 (W. Va. 1937).
5 Pound, supra n. 4.
a Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N. W. 451, 455 (1923), 33 A. L. R. 269
(1924); Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 191 S. E. 368, 371 (W.
Va. 1937).
7 The term "aesthetic considerations" imports elements of beauty or sight-
liness. The "mental depression" referred to in the funeral home cases does
not necessarily - nor ordinarily - involve any considerations of beauty.
8 New Jersey: Westcott v. Middleton, 43 N. J. Eq. 478, 11 AtI. 490 (1887);
Kentucky: Pearson & Son v. Bonnie, 209 Ky. 307, 272 S. W. 375 (1925), 43
A. L. R. 1166 (1926); Oregon: Stoddard v. Snodgrass, 117 Ore. 262, 241 Pac.
73 (1925); and California: Dean v. Powell Undertaking Co., 55 Cal. App. 545,
203 Pac. 1015 (1921), are included in the minority of jurisdictions which
definitely refuse to say that a funeral home in a residential district constitutes
a nuisance merely by reason of its location in such a district.
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protection,9 even where such protection can be afforded only by
sacrificing property rights. Also indicative of the trend toward
legal recognition of the aesthetic, are the repeated legislative at-
tempts to protect the beautiful by invoking the police power to
sustain zoning and billboard laws.10 It is true that the United
States Supreme Court has said that the police power cannot be
exercised solely for the protection of the aesthetic,"1 but the same
court has tacitly approved such laws by engaging in some re-
markable tours de force of legal reasoning to sustain them. 2 The
state courts, in deciding similar- cases, have frequently shown a
recognition of and a sympathy with the tendency to protect the
aesthetic sensibilities. In most of these cases, the courts have con-
fined themselves to the use of language indicative of their attitude,"
but in a few cases the relief granted, 4 or a holding has been based
on the -protection of aesthetic considerations.' In the latter cate-
gory, probably the most outstanding decision is the recent case
of General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public
Works, 1 in which the Massachusetts court held that considerations
of taste and fitness were grounds sufficient to sustain a statute
regulating outdoor advertising.
In West Virginia, Fruth v. Board of Affairs of City of Charles-
ton'L7 is apparently the only case which, prior to 1937, dealt with
9 Some of the cases say that "mentaf depression" alone is a sufficient ground
for an injunction: Tureman v. Ketterlin, 304 Mo. 221, 263 S. W. 202 (1924);
Street v. Marshall, 316 Mo. 698, 291 S. W. 494 (1927); Cunningham.v. Miller,
178 Wis. 22, 189 N. W. 531 (1922). Other courts say that the "Imental de-
pression" causes ill health which constitutes a physical injury; Bragg v. Ives,
149 Va. 482, 140 S. E. 656 (1927); or that "mental depression" is merely one
of several factors - danger to health, noxious odors - which together con-
stitute a nuisance, Saer v. Joy, 198 Mich. 295, 164 S. W. 507, L. R. A. 1918A
825 (1917).
10 See City of Passaic v. Patterson Bill Posting Co., 72 N. J. L. 285, 62 AtI.
267 (1905) (city ordinance regulating billboards); Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114 (1926), 54 A. L. R. 1016 (1928) (zoning
ordinance); Fruth v. Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va. 456, 84 S. E. 105 (1915)
(city ordinance establishing a building line).
1 City of Passaic v. Patterson Bill Posting Co., 72 N. J. L. 285, 62 Atl. 267(1905); St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U. S. 269,
39 S. Ct. 274 (1919).
12 Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U. S. 526, 37 S. Ct. 190, L. R. A.
1918A 136, Ann. Cas. 1917C 594 (1917); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114 (1926).
's Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N..W. 451 (1923); General Outdoor
Advertising Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 85, 172 N. E. 309 (1930).
'4 Yeager v. Traylor, 306 Pa. 530, 160 Atl. 108 (1932).
'5 Ware v. City of Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99 (1923).
16 289 Mass. 149, 193 N. E. 799 (1935).
1 75 W. Va. 456, 84 S. E. 105 (1915).
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the problem of protecting aesthetic considerations. That case,
which involved a city ordinance establishing a building line, re-
fused to permit the extension of the police power to protect the
aesthetic. Nevertheless, the court there used language indicating
that at some future time conditions might exist in West Virginia
which would warrant a holding that aesthetic considerations were
entitled to legal recognition. In the very recent case of Parkers-
burg Builders Material Co. 'v. Barrack,18 the court apparently
found the existence of such conditions, because the long and well
considered dictum in that case expresses an unequivocal recognition
of an individual interest in the protection of the aesthetic sensi-
bilities. The question was presented to the court by a bill seeking
to enjoin as a nuisance the maintenance of an allegedly unsightly
car wrecking establishment in a residential section.
Unfortunately, the final decision of the case turned on the
point that there was not a sufficient showing that the neighborhood
was of such an essentially residential character as would warrant
the issuance of the injunction under the allegations of the bill.
Hence, the expressions of the court concerning protection of the
aesthetic lack the dignity of a holding. Nevertheless, in view of
the fact that a majority of the court assented to what was said
in the dictum in the face of a vigorous dissent, 9 it would seem
that in a case presenting the issue squarely, the West Virginia
court would give full legal protection against those things which
are unduly offensive to the eye or tastes.
V. V. C.
18 191 S. E. 368 (W. Va. 1937). An opinion concurring -with the holding but
dissenting from the dictum is reported in 192 S. E. 291 (W. Va. 1937).
'9 Parkersburg Builders Material Co. v. Barrack, 192 S. E. 291 (W. Va.
1937).
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